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Introduction
CALIFORNIA HAS ONE OF THE MOST RIGOROUS, active, and
thorough insurance rate regulatory systems in the country. The cur-
rent system—housed in Chapter 9, Division 1, Part 2 of the Insurance
Code (“Chapter 9”)1—represents a complete overhaul of the previous
“open competition” system in existence since the 1947 enactment of
the McBride/Grunsky Act. The 1988 voter initiative Proposition 103
replaced that system with “prior approval” rate regulation. Under Pro-
position 103, an insurer must apply for and obtain the insurance com-
missioner’s “prior approval” before charging a changed rate.2 The
standard for approval is that the proposed rate must not be “excessive,
inadequate, unfairly discriminatory or otherwise in violation of [Chap-
* Vanessa O. Wells, a partner in the San Francisco office of Sedgwick, Detert, Moran
& Arnold LLP, focuses her practice on complex business litigation and specializes in
insurance pricing matters, insurance rates and underwriting, and other regulated
practices. Ms. Wells obtained her juris doctor degree, summa cum laude, from Santa Clara
University in 1985, and her Bachelor of Arts degree from Stanford University in 1981. Ms.
Wells regularly practices before the California Insurance Commissioner, and appears for
insurers as parties and amici curiae in cases involving the jurisdictional issues explored in
this Article. Ms. Wells is also a frequent speaker on this topic.
1. Chapter 9 has housed California’s rate regulatory system since 1947. Proposition
103 eviscerated most of Chapter 9 as it existed prior to 1988, and added Article 10. See
generally CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET FOR THE NOVEMBER 8TH GENERAL ELECTION (1988).
The Article 10 statutes added by Proposition 103 are sections 1861.01–1861.14. Subsequent
to Proposition 103’s adoption, the Legislature has from time to time amended Article 10,
accounting for the additional statutes that appear in the Article today. See CAL. INS. CODE
§§ 1861.15–1861.16 (West 2005).
2. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01(c) (West 2005).
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ter 9].”3 This system of rate regulation is typical of “prior approval”
laws in numerous states, but Proposition 103 included novel innova-
tions, such as a mandatory “good driver” discount,4 rigid regulation of
private passenger auto rating factors,5 and certain proscriptions on
cancellation of private passenger auto policies.6 Proposition 103 also
included provisions designed to encourage consumer participation in
the rate review and rate hearing process, such as a provision for com-
pensation and witness fees for participants.7
Despite this elaborate system and generous provision for con-
sumer participation within it, plaintiffs’ class action attorneys and con-
sumer groups insist that they may also assert rate actions against
insurers in the courts. These court actions purport to enforce Proposi-
tion 103’s statutes, and typically challenge rates that have already been
approved by the Insurance Commissioner. This Article explores the
decades-long debate sparked by these rate cases: may the courts enter-
tain original actions challenging rates and rate matters, or is the com-
prehensive regulatory system, established by Chapter 9 and vastly
enhanced by Proposition 103, the exclusive mechanism for resolving
rate issues?
The answer lies within the Chapter 9 statutes, and their correct,
contextual interpretation. While Proposition 103 certainly wrought
sweeping changes, it nonetheless retained the backbone of the Mc-
Bride/Grunsky Act as the framework for the new rate regulatory sys-
tem. This framework includes three statutes that make the Chapter 9
mechanism exclusive—sections 1860.1–1860.3 of the Insurance Code.
The Chapter 9 mechanism creates a separate system that is predomi-
nantly “quasi-legislative”8 and relies upon decision makers with techni-
cal expertise on a technical subject matter, all subject to judicial
review. The mechanism is consumer-friendly, it does not require an
attorney, and it provides for compensation for advocacy regardless of
whether the “advocate” is an attorney. It also includes independent
3. Id. § 1861.05(a).
4. Id. § 1861.02(b).
5. Id. § 1861.02(a).
6. Id. § 1861.03(c).
7. Id. § 1861.10 (fees and intervention); id. § 1861.04 (provision to consumers of
rate comparisons); id. § 1861.05(b) (every insurer may request a hearing); id. § 1861.06
(public notice of rate filings); id. § 1861.07 (information provided to the commissioner is
available for public inspection); id. § 1861.09 (judicial review, which allows judicial review
of a denial of a request for hearing).
8. See 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 878 P.2d 566, 602–03 (Cal. 2004).
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judicial review once an administrative proceeding is concluded.9 The
penalties that can be imposed for violations are severe.10 The system is
comprehensive and exclusive, and does not provide for enforcement
through class or other ordinary civil actions brought in a court.
The treatment of rate cases brought in California courts under
Proposition 103 is confusing and inconsistent. Various forces contrib-
ute to the lack of clarity.
First, there is a fundamental misunderstanding about the en-
forcement of the regulatory system imposed by Proposition 103. Pro-
position 103, inter alia, requires regulatory approval of proposed rates,
and the insurer has no choice but to charge the approved rate. The
regulatory process allows consumer participation through administra-
tive adjudication and judicial review—but does not include dual re-
course in the form of private civil or class actions. As noted, there are
statutes making this an exclusive mechanism.
Much confusion has arisen through a misperception that the key
question is which of competing common law doctrines should be ap-
plied, rather than maintaining a focus on the statutory mandate. Ini-
tially, the appellate authority correctly construed the statutory system
and held that the Chapter 9 statutes barred private actions. Specifi-
cally, in Walker v. Allstate Indemnity Co. (“Walker”),11 the California
Court of Appeal reviewed a challenge to various insurers’ allegedly
“excessive” private passenger auto insurance rates as violating Califor-
nia’s Unfair Competition Law and various common law claims.12 The
court held that Chapter 9, as revamped by Proposition 103, does not
permit enforcement through an ordinary civil action. A subsequent
decision by a different California Court of Appeal creates substantial
confusion regarding the scope of the Commissioner’s exclusive origi-
nal jurisdiction over rates. In Donabedian v. Mercury Insurance Co.
(“Donabedian”),13 the court ultimately held that in the demurrer con-
text a court could not assume the pivotal fact of approval, but on the
way to that holding discussed several possible constructions of the
Chapter 9 statutes, and suggested that the common law “primary juris-
diction” doctrine was likely sufficient to address policy issues. Follow-
ing Donabedian, two other appellate panels have speculated in dicta
9. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1858–1858.7 (West 2005); see also Garamendi, 878 P.2d at
583–84, 599, 604.
10. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1858.07, 1858.3, 1858.5, 1859.1, 1861.14 (West 2005).
11. 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132 (Ct. App. 2000).
12. Id. at 133–38.
13. 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 45 (Ct. App. 2004).
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regarding the scope of the Commissioner’s exclusive jurisdiction,
each interpreting Donabedian differently.14 Adding to the confusion is
a lurking 1992 decision by the California Supreme Court, Farmers In-
surance Exchange v. Superior Court.15 In that opinion, the Court assessed
the applicability of two competing common law doctrines—“exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies” versus “primary jurisdiction”—but
the opinion contains no analysis of the governing statutes. The Court
did hold that the common law “primary jurisdiction” doctrine re-
quired that the case proceed before the Insurance Commissioner.16
But the absence of a statutory analysis has proved a conundrum to
lower courts attempting to understand the opinion. The result of
these authorities is that there is no clear direction concerning the
scope of the Insurance Commissioner’s statutory jurisdiction over
rates and rate matters.
Secondly, the questions presented require a deep understanding
of a complex and arguably archaic body of law outside the typical judi-
cial fare. Resolution of these questions requires the correct interpreta-
tion of the law, an exercise unquestionably within the judicial
prerogative.17 But the issues are outside the usual experience
presented by most litigation, and the foreign nature of the subject
matter makes it less instinctive and more confusing than the vast ma-
jority of questions presented in judicial proceedings. Courts’ lack of
familiarity with the subject matter enhances the likelihood that courts
will defer to the regulator, a dicey proposition when the regulator has
taken both sides on the question.18 The existence of complex and rar-
efied issues has compounded the confusion in this area.
14. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653 (Ct. App. 2006)
[hereinafter Farmers 2006]; Fogel v. Farmers Group, Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61 (Ct. App.
2008).
15. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 826 P.2d 730 (Cal. 1992) [hereinafter Farm-
ers 1992]. Because there are two relevant decisions captioned “Farmers v. Superior Court,” to
avoid confusion this Article will refer to the 1992 California Supreme Court opinion as
“Farmers 1992” and to the 2006 Court of Appeal opinion as “Farmers 2006.”
16. Farmers 1992, 826 P.2d 730, 744–45 (Cal. 1992).
17. See, e.g., Bodinson Mfg. v. Cal. Employment Comm’n, 109 P.2d 935, 939 (Cal.
1941) (“The ultimate interpretation of a statute is an exercise of the judicial power.”).
18. In Walker v. Allstate Indem. Co., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132 (Ct. App. 2000), the Commis-
sioner submitted a brief at the trial court level arguing that the commissioner has exclusive
jurisdiction over rate matters. Brief for the Respondant at 5, Walker v. Allstate Indem. Co., 92
Cal. Rptr. 2d 132 (Ct. App. 2000) (No. A083865), 1999 WL 33657147. In Donabedian, the
Department of Insurance submitted an amicus brief in support of the plaintiff/appellant,
arguing that there should be an ability to bring a rate case in a court. Application of the
Cal. Dep’t of Ins. for Permission to File Amicus Curiae Brief at 11, Donabedian v. Mercury
Ins. Co., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 45 (Ct. App. 2004) (No. B159982), 2003 WL 23280980. Putting
aside sheer politics, at times the Commissioner may be influenced by conditions emphasiz-
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This Article analyzes the language, purpose, and context of Cali-
fornia’s rate regulatory system to determine a reasonable construction
of the Insurance Commissioner’s exclusive original jurisdiction over
rates. Part I provides an historical review of how rate issues have been
dealt with by various courts. This Part first reviews basic historical in-
surance concepts in common law. It then reviews various provisions of
the California Insurance Code that set the foundation for establishing
the Commissioner’s exclusive jurisdiction. Part II reviews the relevant
case law. Though this Part attempts to sort through the various inter-
pretations of Proposition 103, the case law is hopelessly muddled and
often contradictory. Part III attempts to clarify the scope of the Com-
missioner’s jurisdiction by suggesting a straightforward interpretation
of the statutes at issue. This interpretation yields the following four
conclusions regarding the Insurance Commissioner’s exclusive
jurisdiction:
First, the Insurance Commissioner does have exclusive original ju-
risdiction to determine whether rates are “excessive,” “inadequate,”
“unfairly discriminatory,” or “otherwise in violation of [Chapter 9].”19
Second, where a civil action presents a claim solely within the In-
surance Commissioner’s exclusive original jurisdiction, as described
above, the civil action cannot be maintained. This would be the case,
for example, where the claim is that rates are “excessive,” or that an
insurer violated a rate statute or regulation, or that there is a systemic
fault in the approved rates (as opposed to a misapplication in a partic-
ular case).
Third, where a civil action presents a claim a part of which falls
within the Insurance Commissioner’s exclusive original jurisdiction,
then the Commissioner has primary and exclusive jurisdiction over
that issue. The Court must cede to the Commissioner’s jurisdiction to
decide that issue.20 If the Commissioner’s decision leaves a case to be
decided, then the Court has jurisdiction to decide the remainder of
ing the need for uniform application of rate standards by an agency with the appropriate
technical expertise, while at other times the lack of agency resources to adequately review
each and every filing might prompt a different response.
19. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.05(a) (West 2005).
20. While California case law refers to primary jurisdiction as “discretionary,” the
cases considering the doctrine in the rate context consistently hold that the court’s juris-
diction could only be exercised one way under the circumstances presented. Farmers 1992,
826 P.2d at 732 (“We hold that prior resort to the administrative process is required in the
circumstances of this case.”); Jonathan Neil & Assocs., Inc. v. Jones, 94 P.3d 1055, 1065–66
(Cal. 2004) [hereinafter Jonathan Neil] (holding that trial court abused its discretion in not
staying the case under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, and that “the case for invoking
the primary jurisdiction of the Insurance Commissioner is compelling”).
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the case. For example, in Jonathan Neil & Associates, Inc. v. Jones
(“Jonathan Neil”),21 if the Commissioner determined that the insurer
incorrectly calculated the rates and premiums charged to the insured,
then the insured would be able to proceed with its civil action for
breach of contract.
Fourth, where the civil action presents a question involving appli-
cation of a rate (or rating rules) in a particular case, the Commis-
sioner’s exclusive jurisdiction over rates is not presented. For
example, if an insurer’s agent misapplied the rules in calculating rates
for specific business, then the Insurance Commissioner’s jurisdiction
is not implicated.22
Even if adopted, the application of this basic set of guidelines for
interpreting the scope of the Insurance Commissioner’s jurisdiction
in rate matters will likely continue to present complex issues and chal-
lenges. Nevertheless, establishing such a basic set of rules would be an
important first step in clarifying the respective roles of courts and the
Commissioner in matters affecting insurance rates.
I. The Historical Framework Governing Rate Regulation
A. Common Law Concepts
For over a century, courts have recognized that the existence of
specialized government agencies with specific technical expertise and
oversight concerning the prices charged by regulated businesses cre-
ates unique issues of comity and jurisdiction as to cases involving rates.
While the challenge addressed by this Article focuses on the correct
construction of California’s statutes, an informed consideration of the
scope of the Insurance Commissioner’s exclusive original jurisdiction
over rates requires an understanding of several common law doctrines
developed in related contexts. The established traditions reconciling
the respective spheres of the courts and regulators form the backdrop
for resolving this issue in California.
1. Filed Rate Doctrine
The “filed rate doctrine” is a creature of federal jurisprudence
developed in the context of federal agency rate regulation. The essen-
21. 94 P.3d 1055 (Cal. 2004).
22. Note that there might be a threshold question as to whether the agent actually
correctly applied the rules, with the real issue being whether the plaintiff has correctly inter-
preted the rules. The could require resort to the Commissioner to understand the rules.
But if the matter involves purely a miscalculation, the Commissioner’s special expertise is
not implicated. See, e.g., Jonathan Neil, 94 P.3d at 1063–65.
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tial doctrine is that, where rates must by law be “filed” with an agency,
the regulated entity cannot be sued in a civil action for charging the
filed rate.23 As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in one opinion:
“The considerations underlying the doctrine . . . are preservation of
the agency’s primary jurisdiction over reasonableness of rates and the
need to insure that regulated companies charge only those rates of
which the agency has been made cognizant.”24 Further, a civil court
may not award relief in an action that does not directly challenge the
filed rate, where the relief would have the effect of retroactively adjust-
ing the filed rate.25 Federal decisions give the doctrine a fairly broad
sweep.26
Numerous jurisdictions have adopted the filed rate doctrine as
applicable to insurance rates.27 This is a logical conclusion, for numer-
23. See, e.g., AT&T v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214 (1998); Square D Co. v.
Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 417, 422 (1986); Keogh v. Chicago & N.W.
Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
24. Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577–78 (1981) (citation omitted).
25. See Day v. AT&T Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55, 60–65  (Ct. App. 1998) (claim alleging
deceptive practices in the sale of phone cards where charges were based on any portion of
minute used, and purchasers allegedly were deceived and believed that charges were dis-
tributed pro rata, was not barred by filed rate doctrine, but filed rate doctrine did bar any
monetary relief which would have constituted a retroactive adjustment to the filed rates);
but see Spielholz v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197, 204–06, 208 (Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that filed rate doctrine applied only to bar claims specifically directed to the rate,
and not to claims addressed to unrelated conduct where the remedy would retroactively
change the rate).
26. See AT&T, 524 U.S. 214; Square D Co., 476 U.S. 409.
27. Alston v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 585 F.3d 753, 765 (3d Cir. 2009) (filed rate
doctrine did not apply to plaintiff’s claim that artificially inflated mortgage insurance rates
were inflated reinsurance premiums constituting part of the expenses considered in the
rate, and because plaintiff could not state a claim based on alleged inflation of filed rate,
plaintiff lacked standing to bring a claim under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act); Winn v. Alamo Title Ins. Co., No. A-09-CA-214-SS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65889, at
*28–29 (W.D. Tex. May 14, 2009) (filed rate doctrine barred claims that title insurers’ filed
rates were inflated by improper conduct); Hooks v. Am. Med. Sec. Life Ins. Co., 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 81451, at *19 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2008) (citing N.C. Steel, Inc. v. Nat’l Counsel
on Compensation Ins., 496 S.E.2d 369, 374 (N.C. 1998) (filed rate doctrine barred claim
based on alleged charging of unapproved renewal rates, where renewal rates adjusted orig-
inal approved rates and “‘plaintiffs could not prove their claim without the rate set by the
Commissioner being questioned’”)); Rios v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 469 F. Supp.
2d 727, 735, 739 (S.D. Iowa 2007) (filed rate doctrine barred claim where it would involve
court in determining amount of the rate attributable to allegedly illusory endorsement and
require court to “second guess” what rate the regulator would have allowed absent the
allegedly illusory endorsement); McKenzie v. Progressive Auto Pro Ins. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26156 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2007); Freed v. N.H. Indem. Co., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26158 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2007) (both dismissing action without prejudice under
filed rate or primary jurisdiction doctrine, where plaintiffs alleged that rate differentials
charged to policyholders paying in installments rather than paying up front were addi-
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tional, hidden installment fees boosting actual installment fees above the statutorily per-
missible level); Heaphy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24943, at
*5 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 2, 2006) (“There is ample authority in this and other jurisdictions to
the effect that the reasonableness of a rate cannot be challenged where that rate was re-
quired to be (and was) filed with a regulatory agency authorized to review it.”). In this case,
the court held that the filed rate doctrine bars claims based on reasonableness of rate and
alleged practices affecting rate); Korte v. Allstate Ins. Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 647 (E.D. Tex.
1999) (applying filed rate doctrine to bar “subsidy” claims); Allen v. State Farm Fire and
Casualty Co., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (S.D. Ala. 1999) (filed rate doctrine applied to bar chal-
lenge to rates approved by Commissioner); Mullen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2009 Colo. App.
LEXIS 1566 (Sept. 3, 2009) (a dispute whether a benefit is worth the premium paid for it is
an insurance rate issue precluded from judicial consideration under the filed rate doc-
trine); Horwitz v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 745 N.E.2d 591, 596 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (apply-
ing Colorado law and granting summary judgment in action based on rates filed with the
Commissioner); Anzinger v. Illinois State Med. Inter-Ins. Exch., 494 N.E.2d 655 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1986) (because the regulator had exclusive original authority to initially determine the
reasonableness and non-discriminatory nature of filed rates, there could be no implied
right of action); Amundson & Assocs. Art Studio v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., 988 P.2d
1208 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (applying filed rate doctrine to preclude antitrust claims); Com-
monwealth ex rel. Chandler v. Anthem Ins. Cos., 8 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999) (“Al-
though the filed rate doctrine originated in the federal courts, it ‘has been held to apply
equally to rates filed with state agencies by every court to have considered the question.’”
In this case, the court held  that filed rate doctrine bars private civil actions, but not actions
by the Attorney General seeking injunctive relief and civil penalties which would not affect
rate.); Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 721 N.W.2d 307, 312–13 (Minn. 2006)
(adopting filed rate doctrine and recognizing multiple rationales, including separation of
powers, comity, legislative nature of ratemaking, technical expertise of regulator, and un-
foreseen consequences of potential court orders on entire rating plan and system; noting
that “most states have adopted the filed rate doctrine, and many apply it to insurance
regulation”); Am. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Wells, 819 So. 2d 1196, 1205 (Miss. 2001) (noting
that “the acceptance of the [filed rate] doctrine’s basic applicability is near universal” and
applying doctrine to bar aspect of claim challenging insurance rates and terms); Richard-
son v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955, 963 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (“[W]e
also reject plaintiff’s mistaken contention that the filed rate doctrine does not apply to the
insurance industry not only because courts are not institutionally suited to regulate insur-
ance premium and benefit rates, but also because of the extensive regulation of this indus-
try. We, thus, align our decision with the considerable weight of authority from other
jurisdictions that have applied the filed rate doctrine to ratemaking in the insurance indus-
try.”); City of N.Y. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 693 N.Y.S.2d 139, 139 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)
(action by New York City and putative class alleging that auto insurance rates were exces-
sive and unfairly discriminatory because they did not drop based on drop in auto theft
rates was barred by filed rate doctrine); Byan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 662 N.Y.S.2d 44,
44 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (court dismissed plaintiff’s “consumer fraud” action as barred by
filed rate doctrine); Minihane v. Weissman, 640 N.Y.S.2d 102, 102 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)
(claiming that fraudulently obtained filed rate was barred by filed rate doctrine; doctrine
exists “to ensure that rates charged are stable and non-discriminatory, bearing in mind that
the regulatory agencies presumably are most familiar with the workings of the regulated
industry and are in the best position, due to experience and investigative capacity, to estab-
lish the proper rates”); N.C. Steel v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., 496 S.E.2d 369, 372 (N.C.
1998) (holding that filed rate doctrine barred claim that rates were excessive because in-
surers withheld from Commissioner information about servicing fees charged in addition
to the rate: “We believe this is a good example of why questions involving rates should be
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ous reasons articulated in the opinions. Rate regulation is considered
inherently legislative in character, because it involves determinations
on matters of economic policy. In addition, regulators—not courts—
have the technical expertise to evaluate rates. The regulator’s jurisdic-
tion in this regard should be respected as a matter of separation of
powers and comity. Further, for active rate regulation to work effec-
tively, it must be managed through the system created for that task. It
cannot be fragmented throughout the court system with different trial
courts making different determinations on the same rate issues. More-
over, to the extent there has been approval of the rate by the regula-
tor, there are fairness issues around allowing private damage actions
where the insurer was justified in relying upon the regulator’s ap-
proval in charging the rate.
settled by the Insurance Commissioner and not by a jury. Whether the payment of the
servicing carrier fees is a relevant factor which must be considered by the Commissioner in
setting rates . . . is a technical question which requires considerable expertise to answer. It
is best decided by the Commissioner, who has the expertise. It should not be decided by a
court or jury, which does not have this expertise.”); Stutts v. Travelers Indem. Co., 682
S.E.2d 769, 772–73 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (where plaintiff could not prove breach of con-
tract claim without rates set by commissioner being questioned, filed rate doctrine barred
claim); Lupton v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of N.C., 533 S.E.2d 270, 273 (N.C. Ct. App.
2000) (filed rate doctrine barred suit alleging that insurers accumulated and maintained
too great a “reserve” and misrepresented level to Commissioner); Edge v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 623 S.E.2d 387, 390–93 (S.C. 2005) (filed rate doctrine barred claim based
on collecting “facility rate” in response to claim that rate was “illegal,” as plaintiff’s claims
would require court to determine reasonable rate. The Court’s stated reasons for adopting
filed rate doctrine were (1) preserving agency’s authority; (2) recognizing that agency had
expertise whereas courts do not; (3) avoiding undermining regulatory scheme; and (4)
avoiding piecemeal regulation through courts.); Mid-Century Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Ademaj,
243 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. 2007) (acknowledging that Texas had adopted filed rate doc-
trine and applied it in the insurance context, but precluding the insurer from charging fee
not included in the filed rate); State ex rel. CitiFinancial, Inc. v. Madden, 672 S.E.2d 365,
374 (W. Va. 2008) (holding that Insurance Commissioner has exclusive jurisdiction over
reasonableness of rates; adoption of statutes creating claims based on consumer credit
practices does not displace regulator’s jurisdiction over credit insurance rates or create
concurrent jurisdiction with respect to claims requiring determination of reasonableness
of rate); Prentice v. Title Ins. Co., 500 N.W.2d 658, 660 (Wis. 1993) (filed rate doctrine
applied and barred price-fixing action against insurers). Compare Brown v. Ticor Title Ins.
Co., 982 F.2d 386, 393–94 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying Arizona law and holding that filed rate
doctrine did not apply when there was no meaningful review of title insurance rates), with
McCray v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 322, 329 (D. Del. 2009) (“Other
than the Ninth Circuit in Brown, no other court has taken such a narrow view of the appli-
cability of the filed rate doctrine” which held that application is dependent upon a judicial
determination that rate review is “meaningful.”). See also Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
537 F.3d 961, 963 (8th Cir. 2008) (while court in previous opinion held that filed rate
doctrine based on state regulation of insurance rates would not bar federal FEHA claim, in
this opinion Court held that McCarran-Ferguson Act did bar federal FEHA claims chal-
lenging rates regulated by the state Insurance Commissioner).
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2. Primary Jurisdiction
Primary jurisdiction is also a common law doctrine created by fed-
eral jurisprudence and, as originally conceived in the rate context, is
closely related to the filed rate doctrine.28 The original cases promul-
gating this doctrine involved civil actions that were expressly allowed
by statute, but that turned on a rate question.29 The action in toto was
not barred, but whether the action had merit—and thus whether the
plaintiff was allowed to seek redress in court—depended upon a rate
question.
Primary jurisdiction applies where both the court and the regula-
tor have concurrent jurisdiction over an action. In cases involving
tariff or rate regulation, the court may have jurisdiction over the law-
suit, but the agency has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a core
question—for example the reasonableness of the tariff or rate
charged.30 Jurisdiction over the action is proper in the court, but the
question—in a case involving the agency’s exclusive regulatory jurisdic-
tion—has to be referred to the agency. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter—versus jurisdiction over the case—does not directly overlap.
The agency does not have jurisdiction to preside over a damages ac-
tion, and the court does not have jurisdiction to decide such issues as
whether the rate or tariff is “reasonable,” or the correct parameters
for a tariff or rating classification.
For example, one U.S. Supreme Court case involved a question of
whether the defendant had charged the correct tariff.31 The Court
held that this question required resort to the agency that created the
tariff schedule. Reciting the typical list of policy considerations—the
28. See, e.g., Ark. La. Gas Co., 453 U.S. at 577–78 (identifying purpose of filed rate
doctrine is to preserve agency’s “primary jurisdiction over reasonableness of rates . . . ”);
McCray, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 326–27 (citing Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204
U.S. 426 (1907), as the seminal filed rate case despite usually being considered a primary
jurisdiction case).
29. See, e.g., United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956); Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co.,
204 U.S. 426. See also Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258 (1993); Nader v. Allegheny Airlines,
Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296
(1963); Hewitt-Robins Inc. v. E. Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84 (1962); Pa. R.R. Co. v.
United States, 363 U.S. 202 (1960); Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570
(1952); Gen. Am. Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422 (1940); U.S.
Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932); W. & Atl. R.R. v. Ga. Public Service
Comm’n, 267 U.S. 493 (1925); Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchants’ Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285
(1922).
30. See, e.g., W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. at 63 (finding that questions regarding which
was the correct tariff were in the “exclusive primary jurisdiction” of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission).
31. Id. at 63–65.
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special expertise of the agency, the need for uniformity in application
of a regulatory system, and a preference for deference to the agency
charged with administering the regulatory system—the Court ex-
plained that only the agency that developed the tariff schedule could
understand the specific details underlying the assignment of the dif-
ferent tariff levels. Since the economic policies and policymaking in-
volved in those details are inherently legislative in nature,
determination of which tariff applied fell within the “exclusive pri-
mary jurisdiction” of the regulator.32 Importantly, only the core ques-
tion was referred to the agency for consideration—the rest of the case
was stayed (not dismissed) pending the agency’s decision. If the
agency decided that the defendant charged the correct tariff, then the
court need only enter judgment for the defendant. But if the agency
determined that an incorrect tariff was charged, then the plaintiff
could continue with its civil action.
In other cases, the agency might not have exclusive jurisdiction
over the subject matter, as when the court seeks the agency’s views
regarding the correct construction of statutes administered or regula-
tions adopted by the agency. In such a case, the agency’s technical
expertise and familiarity with the problems and policies addressed by
the statutes or regulations might be valuable or even essential to a
proper construction of the statutes or regulations. But courts are the
ultimate arbiters of “what the law is,”33 and the interpretation of stat-
utes and regulations is always within the judicial purview. In this cir-
cumstance, the agency’s and the courts’ jurisdiction over the subject
matter is overlapping.34
32. Id. at 63.
33. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
34. Most published primary jurisdiction opinions involve a determination of whether
or not primary jurisdiction applies. There is little jurisprudence exploring what must hap-
pen as a practical matter if it does. This can be a complicated question. Among other
things, it is well-settled that a party impacted by an agency’s interpretation and application
of the law has a due process right to judicial review. To the extent an agency opinion
involves such an exercise, rather than elucidation or application of technical matter or
announcement of policy choices falling within the agency’s prerogative, a party would be
entitled to judicial review of the agency’s legal opinion. Absent a specific developed struc-
ture for this review, a party must pursue review according to the existing channels for
seeking review of an agency decision, which would generally require a petition for writ of
mandate taken from the agency decision. See Wise v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d
222, 232–33 (Ct. App. 2005). This separate process would have to be pursued to culmina-
tion. A party could not risk res judicata or collateral estoppel by relying upon a challenge
raised in the underlying civil action that gave rise to the primary jurisdiction proceeding.
That would technically constitute a collateral attack on the result in the administrative
proceeding, and would be barred. Cf. Elkin v. Bell Tel. of Pa., 420 A.2d 371, 376–77 (Pa.
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3. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The doctrine of “exhaustion of administrative remedies” is yet an-
other common law doctrine developed to provide a structure delineat-
ing the appropriate roles of coequal branches of government in an
area where their authority coincides. The exhaustion doctrine is im-
plicated in distinct situations in which a party seeks relief from a
court, where there is an ongoing administrative proceeding or an ex-
isting administrative remedy.
First, “exhaustion” applies where the statutory system provides for
administrative action. In most cases there is a right to judicial review
of administrative action. The “exhaustion” doctrine controls the se-
quence and timing of that judicial review. All administrative remedies
must be pursued to finality and “exhausted” before the applicant may
seek judicial review of an agency decision. Thus, in this context, the
“exhaustion” doctrine precludes judicial review of interlocutory or-
ders in an administrative proceeding, and bars a petitioner with an
administrative remedy from short-circuiting the administrative process
and going directly to court.35
Second, the doctrine applies where the statutory system contem-
plates an ordinary civil action as well as an administrative proceed-
ing.36 In this context, the doctrine precludes a plaintiff from pursuing
a statutory cause of action for which the statutory scheme creates a
non-exclusive administrative remedy until completing the prescribed
administrative process. The plaintiff may, however, pursue other com-
mon law claims unless the statutory remedy is exclusive.37 A typical
situation is one where a putative plaintiff must file an agency claim
and obtain a “right to sue” letter before filing an ordinary civil action.
1980) (the agency’s determination on the primary jurisdiction reference is binding on the
court—subject to judicial review through normal channels—and the underlying case in
which the court made the referral is a collateral proceeding). This procedural tangle
would benefit from a legislative sorting, but has not yet achieved sufficient notice to war-
rant action.
35. See, e.g., Abelleira v. Dist. Court of Appeal, 109 P.2d 942 (Cal. 1941) (petitioner
sought review of administrative decision before exhausting all administrative remedies);
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50–52 (1938) (petitioner sought or-
der to enjoin NLRB from holding a hearing).
36. See generally Stevenson v. Superior Court, 941 P.2d 1157, 1171–72 (Cal. 1997) (ex-
plaining that plaintiffs who base their employment discrimination claims directly on Cali-
fornia’s Fair Employment and Housing Act must first exhaust administrative remedies,
while plaintiffs alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, a common law
claim, need not exhaust administrative remedies); see also Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373,
383–88 (Cal. 1990); Medix Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Superior Court, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 249
(Ct. App. 2002).
37. Rojo, 801 P.2d at 387–88.
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The civil action will be barred for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies if the plaintiff attempts to file before obtaining the “right to
sue” letter.
The two situations are analytically distinct in that, in the first, the
only judicial proceeding contemplated is judicial review of the agency
decision, while the second allows for an ordinary civil action. The
commonality is that in each case the courts have applied the judicially
developed rule that the courts will not intervene until the agency pro-
cess has concluded.
4. “Defensive” Exhaustion
In Styne v. Stevens (“Styne”),38 the California Supreme Court ap-
plied the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies when the
administrative remedy was implicated by the defendant’s affirmative
defense, although not by the plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff con-
tended that the doctrine did not apply, because its original complaint
was properly filed as an ordinary civil action in a court. The California
Supreme Court held that the exhaustion doctrine did apply, and that
the plaintiff had to exhaust its remedies with respect to the defense
raised by the defendant before it could proceed with its court action.
The court held that the proper remedy was to stay the action to allow
the parties to pursue the appropriate administrative proceeding to re-
solve the questions raised by the defense.39
This holding significantly blurs the line between exhaustion of
administrative remedies (as applied in this context) and primary juris-
diction. The presentation is unusual for either doctrine, but the more
applicable doctrine would seem to be primary jurisdiction. Indeed,
under a similar scenario, a year later in Jonathan Neil the California
Supreme Court held that primary jurisdiction was the applicable doc-
trine. In Jonathan Neil, the case began as a collection action for premi-
ums owed and not paid. The defendant cross-claimed for breach of
contract/bad faith and alleged that the insurer overcharged for the
insurance. The question of the appropriate charge had to be deter-
mined by analysis and application of certain insurance rate regula-
tions. The Insurance Commissioner and Attorney General contended
that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applied. As
noted above, the court held that the question of whether the correct
rate was charged fell within the jurisdiction of the Insurance Commis-
38. 26 P.3d 343 (Cal. 2001).
39. Id. at 354.
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sioner, and that the trial court had to apply the primary jurisdiction
doctrine.
While this holding is logical, there is no clear distinction between
Jonathan Neil and Styne that would explain the different selection. In
Jonathan Neil, the court never mentions Styne. It is perhaps simply that
one case is in the rate context, within which the primary jurisdiction
doctrine was formed, and one case is not. It is perhaps that the regula-
tory defense in Styne was considered as an affirmative defense, with a
potential separate life apart from the civil action. In any event, there
appears no substantive ramification resulting from applying “defen-
sive” exhaustion versus primary jurisdiction.
B. The Statutes
Section 1860.1 of the Insurance Code explicitly denies plaintiffs a
civil cause of action for any “act done, action taken or agreement
made pursuant to authority conferred” by this Chapter of the Insur-
ance Code.40 Section 1860.2 of the Insurance Code provides that the
administration and enforcement of this Chapter of the Insurance
Code is governed solely by the provisions therein. Further, it states
that all exceptions, modifications, or interpretations of this authority
are also delineated therein.41 Section 1860.3 of the Insurance Code
lists these exceptions, modifications, and interpretations.42 These pro-
40. CAL. INS. CODE § 1860.1 (West 2005). This section states in full:
No act done, action taken or agreement made pursuant to the authority con-
ferred by [Chapter 9 of Division 1 Part 2 of the Insurance Code] shall constitute a
violation of or grounds for prosecution or civil proceedings under any other law
of this state heretofore or hereafter enacted which does not specifically refer to
insurance.
Id.
41. CAL. INS. CODE § 1860.2 (West 2005). This section states in full:
The administration and enforcement of [Chapter 9 of Division 1 Part 2 of the
Insurance Code] shall be governed solely by the provisions of this chapter. Except
as provided in this chapter, no other law relating to insurance and no other provi-
sions in this code heretofore or hereafter enacted shall apply to or be construed
as supplementing or modifying the provisions of this chapter unless such other
law or other provision so provides and specifically refers to the sections of this
chapter which it intends to supplement or modify.
Id.
42. CAL. INS. CODE § 1860.3 (West 2005). These are: sections 1–42 (the sections set-
ting up the Insurance Code upon its adoption in 1935); sections 100–121 (classes of insur-
ance); sections 620 and 621 (defining reinsurance); section 701 (Certificate of Authority:
requirement that there be an adjudicatory hearing held under the provisions of the Ad-
ministrative Procedures Act (“APA”) before the Commissioner can deny a certificate of
authority or impose a monetary penalty); section 704 (requiring APA hearing before Com-
missioner can suspend certificate of authority and allowing suspension of certificate for
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visions evince a clear intent to restrict the administrative/enforcement
mechanism for rates and rating matters to the regulatory system.
The regulatory system is comprehensive and consumer-friendly,
providing for both agency and consumer initiated enforcement.
There is no hardship to the restriction, but certainly the language is
restrictive and incompatible with the conclusion that it actually oper-
ates to permit various civil actions under other provisions, like the Cal-
ifornia business statutes. Yet, as discussed infra Part II, California
courts have both condoned and condemned such actions in a series of
inconsistent and contradictory interpretations of Proposition 103.
II. The Case Law
The confusion in construing sections 1860.1–1860.3 of the Insur-
ance Code post-Proposition 103 stems from the inconsistent opinions
in Walker v. Allstate Indemnity, Co.,43 and in Donabedian v. Mercury Insur-
ance Co.44 Two subsequent opinions—Farmers v. Superior Court45 and
Fogel v. Farmers Group, Inc.46—add to the confusion with conflicting
dicta. These decisions were preceded, however, by three influential
opinions that laid the foundation for subsequent interpretations.
A. Early California Supreme Court Opinions
1. Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Superior Court (“Farmers 1992”)47
The Farmers 1992 action was filed by the Attorney General alleg-
ing violation of Proposition 103’s Good Driver Discount policy provi-
sions, with related alleged violations of the rating standard. The court
certain identified transgressions); sections 730–737 (providing for field examinations); sec-
tions 12903 and 12904 (allowing Commissioner to employ actuaries and other staff and to
purchase such reporting services and books as will aid in administering the chapter); sec-
tion 12919 (making confidential communications to the Commissioner subject to the “offi-
cial information” privilege set forth in CAL. EVID. CODE § 1040 (West 2009)); section 12921
(requiring the Commissioner to enforce the Insurance Code and governing settlements);
section 12921.5 (authorizing the commissioner to meet with people either in person or
through his designee in order to secure enforcement of the Insurance Code); sections
12924–12926 (investigative hearings, and requirement that Commissioner enforce the In-
surance Code); sections 12928 and 12930 (providing for enforcement of penal provisions
by certification to local District Attorney and trial as for any other penal provision); sec-
tions 12975–12977 (providing for funding of enforcement activities, collection of fines and
penalties, refund of overpayments).
43. 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132 (Ct. App. 2000).
44. 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 45 (Ct. App. 2004).
45. 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653 (Ct. App. 2006).
46. 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61 (Ct. App. 2008).
47. 826 P.2d 730 (Cal. 1992).
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dismissed claims asserted directly under the Insurance Code statutes,
but considered alleged violations of California’s Unfair Competition
Law (“UCL”).48 The court stated that its purpose in granting review
was to decide whether it should apply the doctrine of “primary juris-
diction” and stay the suit pending action by the Commissioner.
The insurance company petitioners argued that the doctrine of
“exhaustion of administrative remedies” applied and thus the UCL
claims should first be considered by the Insurance Commissioner.
The court held that the “exhaustion” doctrine did not apply to the
UCL cause of action because a UCL cause of action is properly filed in
a court, and not before the Insurance Commissioner. But, the court
held, the “primary jurisdiction” doctrine did apply to the rate ques-
tions at the heart of the claim and that “prior resort to the administra-
tive process is required in the circumstances of this case . . . .”49
The Farmers 1992 opinion is of great significance in California law
because it adopted the federal primary jurisdiction doctrine as part of
California jurisprudence. But the opinion has created substantial con-
fusion in later rate-based cases because it does not address the con-
struction and application of sections 1860.1–1860.3 of the Insurance
Code where the subject matter of a civil claim directly involves rates or
rate issues.
Prior to Farmers 1992, the industry had referred to application of
sections 1860.1–1860.3 of the Insurance Code as “exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies.” To some, the statutes created a specific, statu-
tory “exhaustion” scheme, and earlier case law had swept application
of the statutes under the “exhaustion of administrative remedies” ru-
bric.50 But this terminology is inaccurate. Under the doctrine of “ex-
haustion of administrative remedies,” a plaintiff asserts a statutory
cause of action for which there is an administrative remedy.51 That is
not the same thing as a case where the plaintiff brings a civil action
that does not itself provide for an administrative remedy, but the sub-
ject matter of that action falls within the jurisdiction of an agency. In
Farmers 1992, the plaintiff alleged a violation of the UCL—a violation
properly brought as a civil action and for which there is no administra-
tive remedy.52 It was the subject matter of the claim that fell within the
48. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200–17209 (West 2008).
49. Farmers 1992, 826 P.2d at 732.
50. See Karlin v. Zalta, 201 Cal. Rptr. 379 (Ct. App. 1984), disapproved in part by Manu-
facturers Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 895 P.2d 56 (Cal. 1995) (see discussion below).
To note, the statutes more closely describe the filed rate doctrine.
51. See Part I.A.3 (discussing exhaustion of administrative remedies).
52. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200–17209 (West 2008) (comprising the UCL).
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Insurance Commissioner’s jurisdiction. Thus, considered under com-
mon law doctrines rather than as a case controlled by statute, Farmers
1992 presented a textbook case of primary jurisdiction.
In subsequent cases, plaintiffs regularly argue that Farmers 1992
held that sections 1860.1–1860.3 of the Insurance Code do not create
exclusive original jurisdiction, because the court declined to apply the
exhaustion doctrine to the UCL claim. This argument misinterprets
Farmers 1992. In fact, the court held that the primary jurisdiction doc-
trine applied, demonstrating recognition that the Commissioner does
have exclusive original jurisdiction over the subject matter. The opin-
ion simply fails to construe the statutes or offer any view on their ap-
plicability to the cause of action pleaded under the UCL. It would
therefore be improper to read into the opinion any implicit hold-
ing—one way or the other—on the question.53
2. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (“Manufacturers
Life”)54
In Manufacturers Life, the plaintiff brokerage sued various life in-
surers and brokers for alleged boycott, price fixing, and other alleged
violations of the Cartwright Act and the UCL. Although the action
concerned life insurance and Chapter 9 rate regulation does not ap-
ply to life insurance, the opinion is important to understanding Chap-
ter 9 and Proposition 103.
At the time Manufacturers Life was before the trial court, the gen-
eral belief was that the industry enjoyed a general exemption from
antitrust and other business unfair practices laws. The general belief
was that the Insurance Code Unfair Insurance Practices Act
(“UIPA”)55 supplanted all other business regulatory laws as they ap-
53. See, e.g., Walker v. Allstate Indem. Co., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132, 138 (Ct. App. 2000). It
should be noted that one of the Attorney General’s principal arguments was that, as Attor-
ney General, he had authority to sue under CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200–17209 (West
2008) as to the same conduct regulated by a separate agency as to which there was a spe-
cific administrative remedy. The Court held that this argument had no bearing on the
application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine. It might, however, make a difference in
considering the application of CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1860.1–1860.3 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010)
as to actions asserted by the Attorney General versus a private plaintiff. This would be
consistent with authority holding that the filed rate doctrine does not bar an action by the
Attorney General. Commonwealth ex rel. Chandler v. Anthem Ins. Cos., 8 S.W.3d 48 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1999) (noting filed rate action bars private action, but not action brought by
Attorney General seeking remedies—injunctive relief and civil penalties—that would not
alter rate).
54. 895 P.2d 56 (Cal. 1995).
55. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790–790.10 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010).
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plied to the insurance industry. This general belief is reflected in at
least three published decisions, cited by the California Supreme Court
in its opinion in Manufacturers Life.56
The court in Manufacturers Life held that this widely held under-
standing was based on a misreading of its own earlier decision in Chi-
cago Title Ins. Co. v. Great Western Financial Corp (“Chicago Title”).57
Contrary to certain appellate court interpretations, the court ex-
plained, the Chicago Title opinion never purported to find a broad,
general exemption for the insurance industry from California’s busi-
ness regulatory laws.58 Rather, the Chicago Title holding was confined
to causes of action directed to rates, and based on the ground, specific
to rates, that “rate regulation has traditionally commanded adminis-
trative expertise applied to controlled industries.”59 The court went
on to further explain that specific Insurance Code statutes governing
rate issues—not the UIPA—created the specific exemption carved out
in Chicago Title, and that the “exemption” thus created was narrowly
tailored to rate issues.60
What does this life insurance decision have to do with construing
a rate regulatory system that does not apply to life insurance? First, the
opinion announced that there never was an “unfair exemption from
the antitrust laws”61 and from other business regulatory laws for the
insurance industry—that is, the exemption Proposition 103 removed
never existed. The opinion also acknowledged that the specific stat-
utes creating an area of exclusive original jurisdiction narrowly con-
fined to rate issues do bar a civil action as to that subject matter.
3. Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Company (“Quelimane”)62
In Quelimane, the plaintiffs alleged antitrust and UCL claims
based on an alleged conspiracy to refuse to issue title insurance in
relation to property acquired by means of a tax sale.63 Defendants de-
56. This understanding is reflected in at least three published decisions—cited by the
court in Manufacturers Life, 895 P.2d at 58, and in Proposition 103. See Liberty Transport,
Inc. v. Harry W. Gorst Co., 280 Cal. Rptr. 159 (Ct. App. 1991); Karlin v. Zalta, 201 Cal.
Rptr. 379 (Ct. App. 1984); Greenberg v. Equitable Life Assur. Society, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470,
474 n.2 (Ct. App. 1973).
57. 444 P.2d 481 (Cal. 1968).
58. Manufacturers Life, 895 P.2d at 62.
59. Id. (citing Chicago Title, 444 P.2d at 492).
60. Id. at 64.
61. Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 103, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET FOR
THE NOVEMBER 8TH GENERAL ELECTION, at 101 (1988).
62. 960 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1998).
63. Id. at 517.
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murred on the grounds that applicable Insurance Code statutes pre-
cluded a civil action, and the trial and appellate courts agreed.64
The California Supreme Court reversed. The court agreed that
the statutes at issue (two Insurance Code sections structured similarly
to sections 1860.1–1860.2)65 would bar a cause of action grounded on
title insurance companies’ activities related to “rate setting.”66 The de-
fendants argued that the sections at issue constituted “the exclusive
regulation of the conduct of escrow and title transactions by entities
engaged in the business of title insurance” and, therefore, its preclu-
sive effect was not confined to rating matters.67 The court held that
the legislative history of this provision showed that the Legislature in-
tended by this language only to preclude attempts at regulation by
local law enforcement agencies, and not to make the prohibition on
civil actions broader than the issue of rates.68
Because it construed statutes substantially similar to sections
1860.1–1860.3 of the Insurance Code, the Quelimane opinion is help-
ful in clarifying that this type of statute does have the restrictive effect
of precluding civil actions concerning the subject matter impacted by
the statutes. But this is perhaps half the inquiry. This model of statute
specifies by reference the matters as to which civil actions are restricted.
The restriction will change with the reference: exactly what civil ac-
tions are precluded depends upon the subject matter specified in the
reference.
B. Opinions Interpreting Insurance Code Sections 1860.1–1860.3
Two published opinions consider and rule upon the interpreta-
tion of Insurance Code sections 1860.1–1860.3 when used in “rate”
civil actions: Walker v. Allstate Indemnity. Co.69 and Donabedian v. Mer-
cury Insurance Co.70 The insurer-defendants made the same arguments
in both cases and the plaintiffs made the same arguments in both
cases (although the facts were more obscured in the second case than
the first). In the first case the Insurance Commissioner appeared on
the side of the defendants at the trial court level and filed no briefs at
the appellate level. In the second case, the “Department of Insur-
64. Id. at 518–19.
65. Id. at 523. The statutes at issue in Quelimane were CAL. INS. CODE §§ 12414.26 and
12414.29 (West 2005).
66. Quelimane, 960 P.2d at 516, 523–24.
67. Id. at 523–24.
68. Id.
69. 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132 (Ct. App. 2000).
70. 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 45 (Ct. App. 2004).
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ance”71 filed a brief as amicus curiae on the side of the plaintiffs. The
First Appellate District Division 2 heard and decided the first case,
and the Second Appellate District Division 1 heard and decided the
second case.72 The two opinions are very different. Some consider
them irreconcilable.
In addition to Walker and Donabedian, there are two other appel-
late opinions Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Superior Court (“Farmers
2006”)73 and Fogel v. Farmers Group, Inc.74 which further complicate the
interpretation of the rate regulation statutes. To the extent relevant,
these cases are also discussed infra.
1. Walker v. Allstate Indemnity Co.75
Walker was originally asserted against numerous insurers writing
auto insurance in the State of California, and against the Insurance
Commissioner. The complaint alleged that the insurer defendants vio-
lated the UCL by charging “excessive” rates in violation of the Proposi-
tion 103 statutes generally and section 1861.05(a) of the Insurance
Code specifically.76 The complaint also alleged that the Commissioner
violated the law by approving the applied for excessive rates.77 The
trial court sustained all demurrers based on its understanding that sec-
tions 1860.1–1860.2 of the Insurance Code provided for an exclusive
administrative hearing process to review excessive rate claims.78
71. Id. at 46. The identity of amicus curiae in the Donabedian case was a curiosity. The
Insurance Commissioner, not the “Department of Insurance,” is the insurance regulator in
the State of California. The Department exists to fulfill the regulatory function, but offi-
cially, the authority rests with the Commissioner. Typically, all legal pleadings and briefs
are filed by the “Insurance Commissioner.” In this case, the briefs were filed by the “Cali-
fornia Department of Insurance” acting through staff counsel, rather than the Insurance
Commissioner acting through the Attorney General. Id. The reason for this oddity was
never disclosed.
72. An interesting bit of trivia is that each of the courts issuing the Walker and
Donabedian opinions have links to the predecessor influential cases. Manufacturers Life re-
viewed and quoted at length from the intermediate appellate court opinion in that case.
Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 895 P.2d 56 passim (Cal. 1995). The inter-
mediate appellate court was the First Appellate District Division 2, which is the Division
that issued the Walker opinion five years later. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v. Superior
Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 424 (Ct. App. 1994); Walker, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132. Justice Mallano—
the author of the Donabedian opinion—was, approximately thirteen years previously, the
trial court judge in Farmers 1992. Donabedian, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 45; Farmers 1992, 826 P.2d
730 (Cal. 1992).
73. 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653 (Ct. App. 2006).
74. 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61 (Ct. App. 2008).
75. 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132 (Ct. App. 2000).
76. Id. at 133.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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On appeal, plaintiffs argued that certain statutes adopted as part
of Proposition 103 rendered sections 1860.1–1860.2 of no force or
effect. Plaintiffs argued that section 1861.03(a) of the Insurance
Code—which makes the business of insurance subject to California’s
business regulatory laws applicable to all businesses—created addi-
tional remedies for rate statute violations in the form of civil actions
under the UCL and, presumably, all of the other statutes referenced
in that section (the state antitrust laws, the state Unfair Competition
Act, the Unruh Anti-Discrimination Act, and every other statute appli-
cable to business generally).79 Plaintiffs argued further that section
1861.10(a) of the Insurance Code—allowing “[a]ny person” to “initi-
ate or intervene in any proceeding permitted or established pursuant
to this chapter, challenge any action of the commissioner under this
article, and enforce any provision of this article”—empowered plain-
tiffs to bring civil actions over rate matters.80 Plaintiffs also argued that
Farmers 1992 supported their position.81
The court acknowledged that “Proposition 103 wrought many
changes” to California’s rate regulation laws, including adding the
prior approval system and providing for public access and consumer
participation.82 Taking into account the changes “wrought” by Pro-
position 103, the court held that “an insurer’s action in collecting pre-
miums consistent with an approved rate is certainly done pursuant to
the authority conferred on the commissioner by the amended Mc-
Bride Act,” and is therefore within the purview of section 1860.1 post-
Proposition 103.83 Additionally, the court explained the following:
If section 1860.1 has any meaning whatsoever (which under the
accepted rules of statutory construction it must), the section must
bar claims based upon an insurer’s charging a rate that has been
approved by the commissioner pursuant to the amended McBride
Act. The statutory scheme enacted by the voters in Proposition 103
compels this result. Under this scheme, the commissioner is charged
with setting rates after an extensive hearing process in which con-
sumers and interested parties are encouraged to participate. . . .
When this process has run its course, the insurers must charge the
approved rate and cannot be held civilly liable for so doing. [ ] A
consumer or an interested party is, however, provided the opportu-
nity to petition the commissioner to review the continued use of
79. Id. at 134, 135–36.
80. Id. at 134, 137.
81. Id. at 138.
82. Id. at 136, 134.
83. Id. at 136.
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any approved rate, i.e. obtain prospective, not retrospective,
relief.84
Notably, moving beyond the preclusive effect of section 1860.1, the
court held that charging an approved rate cannot be considered “ille-
gal,” “unfair,” or “tortuous”—in effect, the approval creates a safe
harbor.85
The court rejected plaintiffs’ arguments based on Insurance
Code sections 1861.03(a) and 1861.10(a), stating:
There is nothing in either statute, or even the two considered to-
gether, to support appellants’ implicit position that they may chal-
lenge a final order of the commissioner in a manner not
prescribed by the amended McBride Act and after the time to do
so has clearly passed. Appellants’ argument seems an obvious at-
tempt to avoid consumer participation provisions of Proposition
103 that appellants deem burdensome or impractical and thus frus-
trate the power granted to the commissioner by the voters to set
insurance rates after soliciting both insurer and consumer input
into his decision. To read sections 1861.03 and 1861.10 as appel-
lants urge would result in an unnecessary conflict between these
statutes and section 1860.1, which embodies the finality of the com-
missioner’s ratemaking decision. Put another way, to accept appel-
lants’ argument would require violation of well-accepted principles
of statutory construction.86
The court went on to note that its holding that section 1860.1 barred
a civil action challenging approved rates was supported by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court’s holdings in Quelimane and Manufacturers Life, as
discussed supra Part II.A.87
Finally, the court addressed plaintiffs’ argument that the Farmers
1992 decision establishes that the Commissioner does not have exclu-
sive jurisdiction over UCL claims challenging rates.88 The court ac-
knowledged a superficial appeal to plaintiffs’ argument.89 But, the
court agreed with Allstate that the Farmers 1992 opinion simply does
not address application of the statutes to the UCL claims.90 The court
noted that the California Supreme Court’s subsequent opinions in
Quelimane and Manufacturers Life establish that, in the high court’s
view, this form of statute does bar a civil action asserted through a
cause of action cognizable in a court, but addressed to a subject mat-
84. Id. (citations omitted).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 137–38 (citations omitted).
87. Id.
88. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing Farmers 1992).
89. Walker, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 138.
90. Id.
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ter placed in the jurisdiction of the Commissioner.91 This would argue
against the superficial reading of Farmers 1992 as holding sub silentio
that sections 1860.1 and 1860.2 only preclude a direct civil action and
not an action brought through some other vehicle such as the UCL.
The court also distinguished the Farmers 1992 case on the facts, as the
Farmers 1992 case did not involve approved rates. “In the end,” the
court held, “Farmers is inapposite.”92
2. Donabedian v. Mercury Insurance Co.93
This case was part of a group of cases, with a history. To under-
stand the case, it is helpful to know the history.
Section 1861.02(c) of the Insurance Code bars an insurer from
using the absence of prior insurance “in and of itself” as a criterion for
determining eligibility for the California Good Driver Discount policy
“or generally for automobile rates, premiums, or insurability.”94 The
object of this provision is to attempt to address the spiraling problem
of uninsured motorists: drivers drive without insurance because auto
insurance is too expensive relative to the driver’s income, and because
the driver has driven without insurance that driver is a higher risk and
the insurance becomes even more expensive, making it even less likely
that the driver will purchase insurance. It is not so much the individu-
als driving without insurance that are the intended beneficiaries of
this provision. The insurance they are required by law to carry is liabil-
ity insurance for the benefit of accident victims. Section 1861.02(c) is
intended to add practical support, so that drivers will be able to com-
ply with the law and purchase insurance, and accident victims will not
go uncompensated because there is no insurance.
Insurers have always been permitted to include “persistency” as a
rating factor.95 “Persistency” is the opposite of “lapse,” and refers to
continued insurance with a particular carrier.96 Statistical data shows
that drivers who have stayed with the same insurer for many years—
drivers with a higher “persistency”—cost less to insure. When this data
is included in formulating rates, drivers may receive substantial dis-
counts for “persistency.”
91. Id.
92. Id. at 139.
93. 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 45 (Ct. App. 2004).
94. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02(c) (West 2005).
95. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2632.5(d)(11) (1989).
96. See Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found., Inc. v. Low, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 75, 80–81
(Ct. App. 2000).
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Mercury is an aggressive, growing insurer attempting to take mar-
ket share from large established insurers. The “persistency” discount is
an obstacle. Mercury devised the “portable persistency” discount in
order to compete for large insurers’ established business. “Portable
persistency” allows policyholders to take “persistency” with them—i.e.,
the applicant receives a discount based on years insured with any in-
surer. Several other insurers also adopted a “portable persistency” rat-
ing factor—indeed, some may well have determined that offering
such a discount was necessary to compete with Mercury.
The problem with “portable persistency” is that if the insurer is
charging certain applicants less because they were previously insured
with any carrier, by definition those who were not insured by any car-
rier are being charged more. This brings the “portable persistency”
rating factor into conflict with the directive of Insurance Code section
1861.02(c) that an insurer cannot utilize the “absence of prior insur-
ance” in rating. To address this conflict, Mercury promoted a bill to
amend section 1861.02(c) that would allow the “portable persistency”
discount.97 The bill passed and the amendments were added.98
While one might have thought that Proposition 103 advocates
would have supported an attempt to compete on price, the opposite
occurred. The Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights
(“FTCR”)—one of the entities founded by consumer rights advocate
Harvey Rosenfield, the principal author of Proposition 103—brought
an action challenging the amendment as an unconstitutional amend-
ment to Proposition 103.99 The court agreed, and the amendment was
held unconstitutional.100
In the interim, numerous actions were filed against various insur-
ers charging violation of Insurance Code section 1861.02(c).101
97. Donabedian, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 59–62; Found. for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v.
Garamendi, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 354, 360 (Ct. App. 2005) (discussing Mercury’s intervention
in support of Senate Bill 841).
98. Garamendi, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 360–61.
99. See id. at 354.
100. Id. at 361–63.
101. Most of the actions charged that insurers were using a “portable persistency” fac-
tor in violation of section 1861.02(c) of the Insurance Code. See, e.g., Donabedian, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 53–55. Where the insurer did not use a “portable persistency” rating factor,
plaintiff’s counsel attempted to manufacture a violation of section 1861.02(c) by arguing
that the insurer’s requirement that an applicant have some form of independent verifica-
tion to support a claim to be accident free constituted a violation of section 1861.02(c) of
the Insurance Code. Opening Brief of Appellant at 3–4, Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co., 11
Cal. Rptr. 3d 45 (Ct. App. 2004) (No. B159982), 2003 WL 23153523. Insurers pointed out
that they could not just take an applicant’s word for it that he or she had, for example, a six
year accident free record. Opening Brief of Respondent at 41–43, Donabedian v. Mercury
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Donabedian was one such action, and the first to go to the Court of
Appeal.
In Donabedian, the superior court (Judge Carolyn Kuhl) sustained
Mercury’s demurrer without leave to amend on the grounds that its
portable persistency rating factor was part of the rates approved by the
Commissioner, and, under Walker, a civil action challenging the ap-
proved rate was barred.102 The Court of Appeal reversed.103
Ultimately, the court reversed on the ground that the action was
decided on demurrer at the pleading stage, and a fact critical to the
trial court order—approval by the Commissioner of the rating factor
as it was applied by Mercury—could not be discerned from the com-
plaint.104 The parties and amici disputed the meaning of materials sub-
mitted for judicial notice, and the court declined to resolve these
disputes at the pleading stage.105 Before announcing this narrow hold-
ing, however, the opinion postulates at least three different construc-
tions of Insurance Code sections 1860.1–1060.3. Each is inconsistent
with the others. Two would create a direct conflict with the Walker
opinion, although the court denied that its decision conflicted with
Walker.
The first postulated construction reads section 1861.03(a) of the
Insurance Code as incorporating the statutes referenced therein—all
California laws regulating business—into the Insurance Code as “pro-
ceedings” for the administration and enforcement of the rate statutes.
Thus, despite the fact that the plain language of sections 1860.1 and
1860.2 limits the administration and enforcement of the rate statutes
to the administrative hearing mechanisms provided for in Chapter 9,
section 1861.03(a) would be read to allow essentially any civil action
under any business regulatory statute as a means of policing the rate
statutes. This interpretation would create a “dual” system of enforce-
ment consisting of civil actions in the courts in addition to a tradi-
tional but expanded administrative system.
The second rationale, in contrast, gives sections 1860.1 and
1860.2 a rigidly restrictive reading. According to this theory, sections
1860.1 and 1860.2 do not have an updated application post-Proposi-
Ins. Co., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 45 (Ct. App. 2004) (No. B159982), 2003 WL 23280979. Plaintiff’s
counsel argued that there would be no way of verifying an accident free record without
prior insurance, and that the accident record verification requirement must therefore be a
ruse to establish a rate based on the absence of prior insurance. Id. at 41.
102. Donabedian, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 47.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 63–64.
105. Id.
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tion 103. They have only the scope they had prior to the statutory
adoption and repeals wrought by Proposition 103. They apply to the
few preserved sections of the McBride/Grunsky Act not repealed by
Proposition 103 that allow certain concerted activity.106
For this rationale, the court relied heavily on State Compensation
Insurance Fund v. Superior Court (“Schaefer Ambulance”).107 In Schaefer
Ambulance, the California Supreme Court considered a statute similar
to section 1860.1—Insurance Code section 11758—set forth in the
workers’ compensation section of the Insurance Code. The Court
noted the similarity between section 11758 and section 1860.1. The
California Supreme Court acknowledged that the impact of section
11758 was to create exclusive original jurisdiction before the Insur-
ance Commissioner over the area covered by section 11758. The next
question was: what was covered by section 11758? To answer that ques-
tion, the court relied in part on the legislative history of the original
McBride/Grunsky Act, because of the similarity of section 11758 to
section 1860.1 and because the legislative history of section 11758 sug-
gested an intent to apply something similar to the McBride/Grunsky
Act to workers’ compensation insurance. The court concluded that
the area covered by section 11758 extended only to concerted activity
concerning ratemaking. Ignoring the complete overhaul to the Mc-
Bride/Grunsky Act accomplished by Proposition 103 some forty years
after this legislative history, which radically altered the area covered by
section 1860.1 (and section 1860.2), the Donabedian court appeared to
read the California Supreme Court’s reliance on the legislative history
of the McBride/Grunsky Act as conclusively establishing that section
1860.1 applied only to the limited concerted activity authorized by sec-
tions 1853.5, 1853.8, and 1855–1855.5.
Finally, the court’s discussion of the Walker holding suggests a dis-
tinction between cases involving the “rate” itself, in contrast to “appli-
cation of the rate.”108 In this part of the discussion the court quoted at
length from the Department of Insurance amicus brief, which argued
that the class plan and rating factors were not part of the rate, but
rather constitute the application of the rate.109 Because, assertedly, the
use of rating factors constitutes application of the rate, that is not part
of what is approved or regulated by the rate regulation statutes.110 The
106. See id. at 61 (citing CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1853.5, 1853.8, 1855–1855.5 (West 2005)).
107. 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 662 (Ct. App. 2001).
108. Donabedian, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 61–62.
109. Id. at 62–63.
110. Id. at 62–64.
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court found Walker—which involved the rate itself—to be
“inapposite.”111
As an overall gloss, the Donabedian court also found—in contrast
to the Walker court’s view on the same question—that Farmers 1992
implicitly held that sections 1860.1 and 1860.2 of the Insurance Code
do not preclude a civil action asserted under the UCL for violation of
the rate statutes.112
The different theories articulated in Donabedian are inconsistent
with each other. Theory 1 states that all of the laws identified by sec-
tion 1861.03(a) become part of the internal rate regulation enforce-
ment mechanism. Theory 2 says that sections 1860.1 and 1860.2
simply carve out a small area of immunity for concerted activity under
a few pre-Proposition 103 statutes. Under theory 1, approved rates
and alleged violations of the rate statutes fall within the ambit of sec-
tions 1860.1 and 1860.2. Under theory 2, they do not. Under theory 1,
the antitrust laws would apply to concerted activity under the pre-Pro-
position 103 statutes through section 1860.1 and 1860.2, because the
antitrust laws are included in section 1861.03(a). Under theory 2, the
antitrust laws do not apply to the specified concerted activity. Thus,
theory 1 and theory 2 cannot both be correct, and the inconsistencies
point up the flaws in both theories.
Additionally, under either theory 1 or theory 2, the claims in
Walker would go forward. Under theory 1, the Walker plaintiffs could
bring a UCL action to challenge approved rates as excessive, because
a UCL action is a permissible mechanism under section 1860.1 for
challenging approved rates. Under theory 2, the Walker claims would
not fall within the narrow ambit given to sections 1860.1 and 1860.2.
Theory 3 is that a civil action lies to challenge “application of the
rates,” but not the rates per se. This may be a correct statement of law,
but is not reconcilable with theories 1 and 2. Under each of those
theories, this is a non sequitur. As noted, under either theory 1 or the-
ory 2, a pure rate claim could proceed, so it does not matter if the
subject matter concerns the rates per se or only application of the rates.
Further, while it may be a correct statement of law that the “appli-
cation” of the rate does not implicate the Commissioner’s jurisdiction,
it is also a correct statement of fact that the “application” of the rate—
rather than the rate itself—is at issue. Donabedian is fairly unique in
that respect. There, the complaint alleged that the plaintiff did not
111. Id. at 62.
112. Id. at 56–58.
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challenge the rates as approved, but their application. Further—and
more importantly—the description provided of the persistency rating
factor in the class plan documents was unclear, and could have been
understood by the Department as describing traditional persis-
tency.113 Consequently, without more, the issue could have been with
the manner of application, rather than with the rates as approved.
But, the rating or class plan itself—which translates the overall pre-
mium the insurer is allowed to charge statewide into the actual rates
which will be charged to insureds—is absolutely an integral part of the
rate and absolutely part of what is approved by the Commissioner.
For working purposes, Donabedian and Walker can be reconciled
on the grounds that Donabedian was decided on demurrer, and it
could not be discerned from submitted materials whether the porta-
ble persistency rating factor was part of the approved rate. The com-
plaint alleged that it was not part of the approved rate, but merely the
“application of” the rate. Walker, on the other hand, involved the rate
itself, and pursuing the claims would involve the court in technical
rate matters assigned to the Commissioner’s exclusive jurisdiction.
The arguments showcased in both Walker and Donabedian, however,
cannot be reconciled. At some point, the conflict must be resolved.
3. Other Appellate Views: Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Superior
Court (“Farmers 2006”)114 and Fogel v. Farmers Group, Inc.
(“Fogel”)115
Two opinions following Donabedian discuss Donabedian, although
the cases themselves address other issues. The opinions are relevant to
the debate because they add to the general confusion.
Farmers 2006 considered whether there could be a private civil
action in a court brought directly under the Proposition 103 statutes.
The court held there was not.116 After expressly finding that
“Donabedian . . . is not on point,”117 the court went on to discuss
Donabedian, reading the opinion in accordance with theory 1 (dual
system) described in the Donabedian opinion.118
113. Id. at 63.
114. 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653 (Ct. App. 2006).
115. 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61 (Ct. App. 2008).
116. See Farmers 2006, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 660.
117. Id. at 663.
118. Id.
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In Fogel, the plaintiff challenged the Attorney In Fact (“AIF”) fee
charged by the insurer/reciprocal exchange as excessive.119 The con-
tractual arrangement stated that the insurer/reciprocal exchange
would collect the AIF fee from the premium paid by the insured sub-
scribers.120 The defendant argued that the AIF fee was bound up with
the approved rate, such that the rate approval should preclude a civil
challenge to the AIF fee. The Court of Appeal viewed the AIF fee as
akin to a third party vendor expense, holding that the approval of the
rate does not extend to cover expenses collected out of premium
funds.121 Given this perspective, the rate approval did not equate to
approval of the AIF fee, the amount of which was not directly consid-
ered in or specifically made a part of the approval. The court expressly
did not reach the question of the correct construction of sections
1860.1–1860.3. Interestingly, the theory advanced in Fogel by amicus
curiae FTCR (the same entity appearing as amicus curiae in
Donabedian)122 was Donabedian theory 2 (limited historical reading of
sections 1860.1–1860.3), in contrast to the Farmers 2006 apparent un-
derstanding of Donabedian as articulating theory 1 (dual system of rate
regulation).123 While the court in Fogel declined to state a construc-
tion, the court did state that it did not agree that Schaefer Ambulance
mandated adoption of the limited historical construction of sections
1860.1–1860.2.124 The court emphasized that in Schaefer Ambulance the
California Supreme Court had expressly chosen to distinguish—not
disapprove—Walker.
III. Resolving the Problem: A Considered Statutory
Construction
The statutory system created by Proposition 103 gives the Insur-
ance Commissioner exclusive original jurisdiction over the narrow
area of pricing regulation unique to insurance. Business regulatory
statutes (applicable to businesses generally) apply to insurance com-
panies in the same way they do to other businesses. There is no gen-
eral immunity for the insurance industry from business regulatory
laws. But for pricing—an area of regulation unique to insurance and
119. Fogel, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 65.
120. Id. at 69.
121. Id. at 72–73.
122. Compare Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 45, 46 (Ct. App. 2004)
(identifying Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights), with Fogel, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
65 (same).
123. Fogel, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 72.
124. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 107 (discussing Schaefer Ambulance).
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not applicable to California businesses generally—the self-contained
enforcement system is comprehensive and exclusive, and does not in-
clude civil actions.
Proposition 103 was intended to—and did—radically change in-
surance rate regulation in California. Before the adoption of Proposi-
tion 103, insurers were not subject to any regulation before charging a
self-selected price. The pricing standard was articulated similarly to
the current standard—rates could not be “excessive, inadequate, or
unfairly discriminatory”—but rates were presumptively not excessive if
the market was judged to be competitive.125 An “aggrieved person”
could make an administrative complaint to the Department regarding
existing rates, and the Insurance Code provided for administrative
hearings.126 Consumer groups, however, viewed this as a non-existent
remedy given the presumption that rates in a competitive market
could not be excessive.127 Adding to their distrust of the administra-
tive remedy, consumer groups also felt that insurance commissioners
were biased because they were appointed and because most came
from the insurance industry (since no one else understood or wanted
the position).128
Proposition 103 brought change. It brought regulation through
review and prior approval rather than reliance on market mecha-
nisms. It brought an elected insurance commissioner “accountable” to
the electorate. It brought numerous provisions enabling consumer
participation in the regulatory process, protecting consumers from ar-
bitrary action by the commissioner, and compensating consumers for
their participation. As part of this system, it brought consumers the
autonomy to seek judicial review in the courts if the Commissioner
refused to grant a hearing.129 But, contrary to the arguments of plain-
tiff’s attorneys, it did not provide for a “dual system” of rate regulation
overlaying civil actions with the comprehensive administrative system.
125. See CAL. INS. CODE § 1852(a) (West 2005) (repealed by Proposition 103).
126. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1858–1858.7 (West 2005).
127. See Harvey Rosenfield, Revolting the Insurance Crisis: The Voter Revolt Initiative, DAILY
J. REPORT, July 15, 1988, at 5 (“The Voter Revolt initiative requires the Commissioner to
ignore the number of other companies in the marketplace in determining whether a rate
is excessive. Today, the Department of Insurance refuses to consider rates excessive if there
is ‘competition’ in the marketplace. The insurers and the Department of Insurance have
always agreed that competition exists (even though state law virtually precludes a real free
market) simply by noting that many insurance companies operate in California.”).
128. Id. (“Presently, the Insurance Commissioner is a political appointee with no ac-
countability to the public. It is no surprise then, that the Department of Insurance has
historically exhibited a pro-industry bias.”).
129. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.09 (West 2005).
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As discussed infra: (1) the statutory language of sections 1860.1–
1860.3, in the context in which it appears, limits available remedies in
matters involving rates; (2) Proposition 103 does end the perceived
general exemption for the insurance industry from California busi-
ness laws, but does not set up those general laws as a remedy for viola-
tion of rate-specific statutes; (3) Proposition 103 adds consumer-
friendly provisions for participation in rate regulation proceedings,
but does not create a “dual system” of rate regulation; and (4) in the
context in which they now appear, sections 1860.1–1860.3 can be read
as codifying a form of the “filed rate doctrine,” accepted across the
country as appropriately adjusting the jurisdiction of the regulator
and the courts.
A. The Statutory Language Limits Available Remedies in Matters
Involving Rates
In repealing most of the previously existing rate regulation stat-
utes, Proposition 103 left sections 1860.1–1860.3 of the Insurance
Code in place. These statutes, as written, purport to strictly limit reme-
dies for both violations of the rate regulation statutes and for claims
concerning actions taken under these statutes (such as charging a rate
approved by the Commissioner).
The language selected is significant. Section 1860.1 of the Insur-
ance Code explicitly denies plaintiffs a civil cause of action for any “act
done, action taken or agreement made pursuant to authority con-
ferred” by Chapter 9.130 Section 1860.2 of the Insurance Code pro-
vides that the administration and enforcement of Chapter 9 is
governed solely by the provisions therein. Further, it states that all ex-
ceptions, modifications, or interpretations of this limitation are also
delineated therein.131 These provisions evince a clear intent to restrict
130. CAL. INS. CODE § 1860.1 (West 2005). This section states in full:
No act done, action taken or agreement made pursuant to the authority con-
ferred by [Chapter 9] shall constitute a violation of or grounds for prosecution or
civil proceedings under any other law of this State heretofore or hereafter en-
acted which does not specifically refer to insurance.
Id.
131. CAL. INS. CODE § 1860.2 (West 2005). This section states in full:
The administration and enforcement of [Chapter 9] shall be governed solely by
the provisions of this chapter. Except as provided in this chapter, no other law
relating to insurance and no other provisions in this code heretofore or hereafter
enacted shall apply to or be construed as supplementing or modifying the provi-
sions of this chapter unless such other law or other provision so provides and
specifically refers to the sections of this chapter which it intends to supplement or
modify.
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the administrative/enforcement mechanism for rates and rating mat-
ters to the regulatory system.
These statutes cannot have been preserved by accident given the
broad sweep of the repeal. More to the point, the restrictive language
of these statutes cannot be reconciled with the suggestion that their
actual effect is to throw wide the door to permit civil actions under
every business regulatory statute on the books. The plain intent and
effect of these statutes is to restrict remedies for alleged violation of the
rate statutes.
B. Insurance Code Section 1861.03(a) Subjects the Insurance
Industry to California’s Business Laws, and Ends the
Perceived General Exemption for the Industry—
But Not in the Narrow Context of Rate
Regulation
Section 1861.03(a) of the Insurance Code is cited by “dual sys-
tem” advocates as the statute that incorporates essentially all of Cali-
fornia law into the Insurance Code. Yet, its plain language cannot
fairly be read to support this construction.
Section 1861.03(a) states: “The business of insurance shall be sub-
ject to the laws of California applicable to any other business, includ-
ing, but not limited to, the Unruh Civil Rights Act . . . and the
antitrust and unfair business practices laws . . . .”132 Under section
1861.03(a), an insurance company can be sued under the antitrust
laws, the Unruh Act, or any other general business statute just like
“any other business.” But “any other business” is not subject to rate
regulation. Making insurers subject to the general business statutes
applicable to “any other business” is wholly different from incorporat-
ing those general business laws into a chapter devoted to insurance-
specific rate regulation as specific remedies for violation of rate stat-
utes. Section 1861.03(a) does the former, not the latter.
California has from time to time adopted statutes that do specifi-
cally incorporate the UCL as a remedy for violation of a statutory
scheme. This form of statute directly states that purpose.133 In con-
Id.
132. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.03 (West 2005).
133. See, e.g., id. § 12693.81 (West 2005) (“It shall constitute unfair competition for
purposes of Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 17200) of Part 2 of Division 7 of the
Business and Professions Code for an insurer, an insurance agent or broker, or an adminis-
trator” to make statements or take action to induce an individual employee to separate
from the employer’s group health coverage in reliance on the Healthy Families Program.);
CAL. INS. CODE § 12725.5 (West 2005) (same as section 12693.81, but concerning the Cali-
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trast to the language of these statutes, the language of section
1861.03(a) does not state that a specific violation of Chapter 9 can be
enforced through the UCL statutes. It states, rather, that the “business
of insurance” should be treated like any other California business, and
be subject to all of California’s business regulatory statutes.134 That is
completely different.
This statute seeks to accomplish the purpose of Proposition 103
to remove the perceived “unfair exemption” for the insurance indus-
try from the antitrust laws and other business regulatory statutes. That
is what the statute says it does, that is what the Ballot Pamphlet for the
November 1988 Election says it does,135 and that is what Proposition
103 author, Harvey Rosenfield, said this statute would do in a July 15,
1988 article explaining Proposition 103 to the electorate. Rosenfield
wrote:
Competition is the key to lower prices for insurance consumers.
Currently, insurance companies are exempted by law from the con-
sumer protection statutes which are applicable to any other busi-
ness in California. These exemptions have artificially blocked
competition in the insurance marketplace for most consumers,
permitting companies to essentially fix prices among themselves,
and resulted in higher rates. The Voter Revolt initiative [i.e., Pro-
position 103] repeals these unjust exemptions, and adds other pro-
competition reforms
***
The Voter Revolt initiative completely repeals the insurance
industry’s exemption from the antitrust laws, and makes Califor-
nia’s other consumer protection laws applicable to insurers for the
first time.136
fornia Major Risk Medical Insurance Program); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1797.86 (West 2009)
(“[A]ny violation of this chapter constitutes unfair competition under Section 17200 of the
Business and Professions Code, grounds for rescission under Section 1689 of this Code,
and an unfair method of competition or deceptive practice under Section 1770 of this
Code.”); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17364 (West 2008) (“Every failure to comply with any
provision of this chapter constitutes unfair competition and shall be enforced under Chap-
ter 5 (commencing with section 17200).”).
134. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.03(a) (West 2005).
135. The Analysis by the Legislative Analyst in the Ballot Pamphlet repeated the percep-
tion that “insurance companies are not subject to the state’s antitrust laws,” and told voters
that “[t]he measure makes insurance companies subject to the state’s antitrust laws.” Analy-
sis by the Legislative Analyst, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET FOR THE NOVEMBER 8TH GEN-
ERAL ELECTION, at 98, 140 (1988); see also Argument in Favor of Proposition 103, in CALIFORNIA
BALLOT PAMPHLET FOR THE NOVEMBER 8TH GENERAL ELECTION, at 100 (1988) (“Proposition
103 will also end the insurers’ exemption from the anti-monopoly laws . . . .”); Rebuttal to
Argument Against Proposition 103, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET FOR THE NOVEMBER 8TH
GENERAL ELECTION, at 101 (1988) (“[Proposition] 103 eliminates the insurance industry’s
unfair exemption from the antitrust laws.”).
136. Rosenfield, supra note 127, at 3.
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As described in connection with the discussion of the Manufactur-
ers Life case, supra, it was indeed the general perception that there
existed a broad insurance industry exemption from the antitrust and
other general business statutes. The Ballot Pamphlet and the Rosen-
field article (to the extent it describes the history of the times)137 es-
tablish that section 1861.03(a) was intended to eliminate that
perceived broad exemption.
From the judicial perspective, there are two conceptual impedi-
ments to a correct understanding of section 1861.03(a). First, contrary
to pre-Proposition 103 belief, the business of insurance was always sub-
ject to California’s general business laws.138 With the passage of time
since the California Supreme Court’s 1995 ruling in Manufacturers Life
to that effect, there remains little awareness of the perceived need for
reform, in 1988, to make the insurance industry subject to California’s
general business laws. Without understanding that history, it would
not be readily apparent why a statute would be necessary to make in-
surers subject to laws already applicable to them—thus inhibiting a
comprehensive understanding of the statute.
Second, section 1861.03(a) is placed within a chapter in the In-
surance Code that is primarily directed to rate regulation. This creates
the illusion that section 1861.03(a) is related to the rate regulatory
mechanism. But there is no such relation. Section 1861.03(a) was
adopted by voter initiative. As has been frequently noted, voter initia-
tive statutes lack the careful craftsmanship that results from the itera-
tive legislative process.139 None of section 1861.03’s subsections have
to do with rates.140 The California Supreme Court recognized this,
137. In Farmers 2006, Harvey Rosenfield and his organization, Foundation for Taxpayer
and Consumer Rights, attempted to use his article as “legislative history” of Proposition
103. The court properly held that the article could not be used for that purpose. Farmers
2006, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653, 664 (Ct. App. 2006). But an article can be used to establish the
“history of the times” for the purpose of showing the context within which the legislation
was enacted.
138. See supra Part II.A.2. (discussing Manufacturers Life v. Superior Court, 895 P.2d
56, 64 (Cal. 1995)).
139. See, e.g., Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Governing By Initiative—Structuring the
Ballot Initiative: Procedures That Do and Don’t Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 76–78 (1995);
Elizabeth Garrett, Perspective on Direct Democracy—Who Directs Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 17, 18–22, 24–27, 31–36 (1997); Matthew L. Spitzer, Perspective on Direct Democ-
racy—Evaluating Direct Democracy: A Response, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 37, 44–45
(1997) (all explaining that voter initiatives tend to be poorly drafted).
140. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.03 (West 2005) (For example, subsection (a) makes the
business of insurance subject to antitrust and other business regulatory laws; subsection (b)
states exceptions to subsection (a) for specific insurance arrangements and practices going
well beyond rates (e.g., multiple insurance entities participating in underwriting a single
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observing that Article 10 of Chapter 9 (adopted by Proposition 103)
“is not limited in scope to rate regulation.”141 Rather, “[t]hrough In-
surance Code section 1861.03, subdivision (a), the article also subjects
the business of insurance to laws prohibiting discriminatory and un-
fair business practices.”142
Section 1861.03(a) was intended to—and to the extent necessary
does—“end” the insurance industry’s broad exemption from the anti-
trust and other general business laws. But it does not function to in-
corporate those laws into Chapter 9 as a remedy for alleged rating
violations.
C. Insurance Code Section 1861.10(a) Adds Consumer-Friendly
Provisions for Participation in Rate Regulation
Proceedings, but Does Not Create a “Dual
System” of Rate Regulation
Insurance Code section 1861.10(a) provides a mechanism for
“[a]ny person [to] initiate or intervene in any proceeding permitted
or established pursuant to this chapter, challenge any action of the
commissioner under this article, and enforce any provision of this
article.”143
“Dual system” advocates argue that their “dual system” argument
is supported by section 1861.10(a), read with section 1861.03(a).144 In
pairing the two, advocates argue that section 1861.03(a) lists all “per-
mitted” actions in which “[a]ny person” is empowered to “initiate or
intervene” as per section 1861.10(a).145 They conclude that section
1861.10(a) makes civil actions asserted under the California business
laws identified in section 1861.03(a) a means of enforcing the provi-
sions of Chapter 9.
This initiative statute cannot bear so fine a parsing. Throughout,
the initiative evinces a cautious drafting style, employing bolstering
language with a “belt and suspenders” effect. Thus, for example, sec-
tion 1861.02(a) refers to determining “rates and premiums” based on
the mandatory rating factors and mandatory “weighting,” although it
would not realistically be possible to determine one but not the other
risk); and subsection (c) limits an insurer’s right to cancel or non-renew an auto policy.).
Section 1861.03(a) does not, on its face, have to do with rate regulation and its placement
within Article 10 does not change its meaning. Id.
141. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 88 P.3d 71, 77 (Cal. 2004).
142. Id.
143. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.10(a) (West 2005).
144. See supra Part III.B.
145. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.10(a) (West 2005).
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according to the statutory strictures. Section 1861.07 of the Insurance
Code provides that “[a]ll information provided to the commissioner
pursuant to this article shall be available for public inspection,” and
then goes on to stipulate that two statutes that would otherwise pro-
tect such information from disclosure do not apply.146 In State Farm v.
Garamendi, the California Supreme Court held that the second clause
in section 1861.07 does nothing more than reinforce the first.147 The
lesson taught by this holding is that placing undue weight on the in-
clusion of multiple supporting words and phrases and relying on the
usual presumption that each has a separate meaning can misdirect the
interpretation of an initiative statute.
Be that as it may, section 1861.10(a) does not, in any case, change
section 1861.03(a) into a statute about “proceedings” rather than a
statute about the substantive law. Several of the Chapter 9 statutes do
focus on procedure.148 Section 1861.03(a) does not bear the same
hallmarks149 and does not “permit” or “establish” a proceeding for
enforcing the rate regulation statutes. As discussed, section 1861.03(a)
makes the business of insurance subject to numerous substantive busi-
ness regulatory laws. In most cases, each separate statutory scheme in-
cludes provision for a civil action as part of the enforcement
mechanism for that statutory scheme. But it is a stretch to read section
1861.03(a) as adopting the civil action enforcement of these business
regulatory laws as a way to enforce the different statutory rate scheme.
This consequence—like the entire “dual system” theory—is far be-
yond any announced purpose of Proposition 103, and irreconcilable
with the limiting language of Insurance Code sections 1860.1 and
1860.2.150
146. Id. § 1861.07.
147. Garamendi, 88 P.3d at 78–80.
148. Section 1861.05 sets forth the rate review process, and includes a right to petition
for hearing. Subsection (c) provides for discretionary and mandatory hearings in different
circumstances. Section 1861.08 sets the parameters for administrative hearings. Section
1861.09, in and of itself and through referencing section 1858.6, allows mandate proceed-
ings (as described in the Government Code and Code of Civil Procedure) in the courts. All
of these statutes—and the section 1858 series pre-dating Proposition 103—are procedural,
and all are comprehended in the section 1861.10(a) reference. Section 1861.05(c), section
1861.08, and preexisting sections 1858–1858.3 could be described as “establishing” pro-
ceedings within the Department for enforcing the Chapter 9 provisions. Section 1861.09
and its referenced section 1858.6 could be described as “permitting” judicial proceedings
under other, Government Code and Code of Civil Procedure statutes. See CAL. INS. CODE
§§ 1861.05–1861.08 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010).
149. See supra note 148.
150. See supra Part III.A.
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Finally, from the 30,000 foot view, the contorted construction
given to sections 1861.03(a) and 1861.10(a) in order to support the
dual system argument simply make no sense. If an initiative statute
were intended to create a judicial challenge to rates as an overlay to
the administrative process, it would do so directly and expressly. Vot-
ers could not be expected to follow the tortured construction used to
support the dual system argument, and there would be no reason not
to include a simple, understandable provision allowing a private right
of action in a court. The fact that provision does not exist strongly
evinces the lack of any intent to include it.
D. Proposition 103 Codifies a Form of Filed Rate Doctrine,
Aligning California’s Insurance Rate Regulatory System
with the Rest of the Country
The filed rate doctrine has been adopted by virtually every juris-
diction to consider its application to insurance rates. California could
elect to be the only state to reject the principles underlying that doc-
trine, but there is nothing in the statutes or in Proposition 103 sug-
gesting that intent. The statutes themselves read as a codification of a
filed rate doctrine. Rejecting the uniformly adopted filed rate doc-
trine and instead adopting a “dual system” of rate regulation would
itself constitute a major initiative that would certainly have been called
out in the initiative statute and the Ballot Pamphlet. It was not.
Rather, Proposition 103 retained the codified “filed rate doctrine” set
forth in sections 1860.1–1860.3 of the Insurance Code, and intro-
duced prior approval rate regulation requiring review and approval by
the Commissioner. That system should be acknowledged and allowed
to work, and the “dual system” argument rejected.
Conclusion
Sections 1860.1–1860.3 of the Insurance Code, by their terms, ar-
ticulate a specific statutory “filed rate doctrine” applicable to insur-
ance rate matters in California. The statutory language cannot be
reconciled with the notion that, through these statutes, California has
elected to depart from the uniform, nationwide jurisprudence and re-
ject the concept of the regulator’s exclusive original jurisdiction over
regulated rates. Thus, California courts should, consistently with the
language of the statutes and the uniform tradition in the context of
regulated rates, recognize the Insurance Commissioner’s exclusive
original jurisdiction over rates.
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This step is a beginning—not an end. There remain difficult case-
by-case problems regarding whether and to what extent a particular
case presents rate matters falling within the Commissioner’s jurisdic-
tion. But recognizing the Commissioner’s statutory exclusive original
jurisdiction would be an important beginning to developing a rational
balance between litigation—which belongs in the courts—and rate
regulation—which belongs with the regulator.
